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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Renel Casseus and Chrisleme Fleurantin appeal from 
their convictions of five counts of alien smuggling resulting 
in a death, in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and 
(B)(iv), and of five counts of alien smuggling in which the 
life of a person was put in jeopardy, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
S 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(iii). Casseus was also convicted of 
reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
S 1326(a). Casseus was sentenced to 120 months of 
incarceration followed by a five-year term of supervised 
release. Fleurantin was sentenced to 80 months of 
incarceration followed by a five-year term of supervised 
release. 
 
Appellants raise the same three issues on appeal. First, 
they contend that because violation of 8 U.S.C.S 
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1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) is a capital crime, under 18 U.S.C. S 3005 
the District Court erred by failing to appoint, upon their 
request, death-penalty qualified counsel to assist in their 
defense. Second, they contend that they were deprived of a 
fair trial because the District Court refused to order pretrial 
discovery of the government's witness list, and refused to 
order the prosecution to make the eyewitnesses, whom the 
prosecution was detaining, available for the defendants to 
interview within a reasonable period of time before trial. 
Finally, they contend that the District Court erred by 
admitting the testimony of an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service agent that the beach upon which the 
aliens were offloaded was not a lawful point of entry 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. S 100.4 (2001). We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Renel Casseus was the captain and Chrisleme Fleurantin 
was a crewman on board the Confiance Endieu, a twenty- 
five foot, open wooden boat. One stormy night, appellants, 
for a fee, brought thirty-one Haitian nationals on this boat 
from St. Martin, F.W.I., to Lindqvist Beach, St. Thomas, 
Virgin Islands. According to witnesses, the boat was 
overloaded, but appellants made the voyage nonetheless. 
When the boat approached Lindqvist Beach, the sea 
conditions were rough and the boat became grounded on a 
reef. While still in deep water, Casseus told the passengers 
to disembark and make their own way to shore. One 
passenger did not make it, and drowned. 
 
Appellants were arrested within a few days, and indicted 
for five counts each of alien smuggling. Later, a 
superceding indictment was returned, setting forth 
sentencing enhancements, and including the five counts 
each of alien smuggling resulting in death, in violation of 8 
U.S.C. S 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(iv). This crime is punishable 
by death. 
 
From the time of their initial arraignments, both 
appellants requested that the District Court appoint death- 
penalty qualified counsel for them. The District Court 
refused, waiting instead for the government to decide 
whether it would seek the death penalty. During this 
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waiting period, plea negotiations were ongoing, although 
unsuccessful. One month after the superceding indictment, 
the government announced that it would not seek the death 
penalty in either case. Both appellants were tried by a jury 
and found guilty as to all counts. 
 
II. 
 
Title 8 of the United States Code, S 1324(a)(1)(A) makes it 
a federal crime to bring, or attempt to bring, an alien into 
the United States through a port other than a "designated 
port of entry." 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) states that a 
violation of (a)(1)(A) that results in the death of any person, 
may be punished by death. At issue here is 18 U.S.C. 
S 3005, which states in relevant part: 
 
       Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime 
       shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel; 
       and the court before which the defendant is to be tried, 
       or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the 
       defendant's request, assign 2 such counsel, of whom at 
       least 1 shall be learned in the law of capital cases. . . . 
 
Appellants were indicted for a capital crime on March 25, 
1999, and they promptly requested death-penalty qualified 
counsel. The District Court did not act upon their requests 
until May 12, 1999, when the requests were rendered moot 
by the government's decision not to seek the death penalty. 
As noted, appellants argue that by failing to appoint "2 
such counsel, of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the 
law of capital cases . . . ," the court erred. We will not 
decide, however, whether the District Court so erred, 
because, even if we assume the court erred, we hold that 
the error was harmless. 
 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) instructs that 
"any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 52(a); see also 28 U.S.C. S 2111. We have held that a 
non-constitutional error committed at trial does not 
warrant reversal where "it is highly probable that the error 
did not contribute to the judgment." United States v. 
Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United 
States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en 
 
                                4 
  
banc). "`High probability' requires that we have a sure 
conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendants." 
United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 342 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 220 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
Because this right to additional counsel is created by 
statute, and not coterminous with the right to counsel 
contained in the Sixth Amendment, the essential question 
is whether there is a "high probability" that the error did 
not prejudice the appellants. Here, we conclude that the 
error did not prejudice the appellants at all. Although the 
possibility of the death penalty was hanging over the 
appellants' heads during plea negotiations, they were not 
pressured by that fact to enter into plea agreements with 
the government, nor to provide it with statements or 
information prejudicial to them at their trial. As the statute 
itself states, the purpose of 18 U.S.C. S 3005 is to allow a 
capital defendant to "make his full defense by counsel." 
This, they were fully able to do. Moreover, after the 
government declared that it would not seek the death 
penalty, the appellants were no longer capital defendants. 
Because appellants were not harmed in any way, we 
conclude that even if the District Court erred, that error 
does require that we reverse their convictions. 1 
 
III. 
 
Appellants' final two issues do not require much analysis. 
Appellants argue that the District Court erred by refusing 
to order the prosecution, within a reasonable time before 
trial, to disclose and allow the defense to interview the only 
available eyewitnesses, who were in the prosecution's 
custody. We disagree. First, it is clear that a criminal 
defendant does not have the right to full discovery of the 
government's case. See, e.g. United States v. Addonizio, 451 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In so holding, we note that our departure from the Fourth Circuit's 
conclusion that "harmless error review is not applicable to a violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 3005 because S 3005 provides an absolute statutory right to 
two attorneys." United States v. Boone, 245 F.3d 352, 361 n.8 (4th Cir. 
2001). We disagree, and for, inter alia, the reasons stated above we 
believe that harmless error review is appropriate. 
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F.2d 49, 62 (3d Cir. 1972) ("in no event is the government 
required to divulge the identity of its witnesses in a 
noncapital case"); 18 U.S.C. S 3432 (a person charged with 
a capital offense must be furnished with a list of witnesses 
at least three days prior to trial). Second, none of the cases 
relied upon by the appellants are applicable. Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) requires the prosecution 
to disclose "evidence favorable to the accused." Here, the 
record is clear that the witnesses had no exculpatory 
information to offer the appellants. Furthermore, 
appellants' reliance on Rovario v. United States , 353 U.S. 53 
(1957) and United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 
1981), is inappropriate. These cases address the duty of the 
prosecution to disclose the identity of confidential 
informants who will not testify. Here, all witnesses did 
testify, and appellants were actually allowed to interview 
these witnesses before trial. We conclude that the Court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying discovery. 
 
Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not err by 
admitting the testimony of an INS agent that Lindqvist 
Beach was not a designated port of entry. There is really no 
dispute that Lindqvist Beach is not a designated port of 
entry according to the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 C.F.R. 
S 100.4 (2001). Agent Nash testified based on her 
knowledge, training, and eleven years of experience in the 
INS that Lindqvist Beach was not a designated port of 
entry. The fact that there is a regulation designating ports 
of entry does not preclude a properly credentialed expert 
from testifying to this fact based on her knowledge and 
experience. As the trial judge noted, he could have taken 
judicial notice of the designation had he so desired, he just 
did not do so. The simple fact is that Lindqvist Beach is not 
a valid port of entry, which fact was properly proven at 
trial. Appellants were not prejudiced by Nash's testimony. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we hold that even if the District Court erred 
by refusing to appoint death-penalty qualified counsel for 
appellants promptly after their indictments for a capital 
offense, that the error was harmless. Next, we find no merit 
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in the appellants' remaining arguments. We will therefore 
affirm the judgments and convictions. 
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